The KSA enters 2026 with a new leadership structure designed to tackle the digital age, yet the Dutch gambling market remains under threat from low channelisation rates and a looming tax hike to 38 percent.
The Dutch gambling landscape has entered a transformative era as the Kansspelautoriteit (KSA) officially activated a major overhaul of its internal governance on 1 January 2026. This strategic pivot moves the regulator away from its traditional hierarchy toward a leaner board structure consisting of a single full time chair and two part time directors. This trio will oversee three newly formed principal directorates: Player Protection and Management Advice, Permits and Supervision, and Digitalisation, Analysis and Business Operations. By compartmentalising these sectors, the KSA intends to foster more agile decision making and a data driven approach to market surveillance.
Chairman Michel Groothuizen continues to lead the organisation, serving as the face of the KSA on both the domestic stage and within the international regulatory community. The search for the two part time board members is nearing completion, with the new appointees expected to serve as expert advisors in the realms of digital transformation and corporate integrity. This administrative refresh coincides with the departure of long standing Vice Chair Bernadette van Buchem, who concludes a distinguished forty year career in the Dutch public sector. Her exit marks the end of an era for the KSA as it prepares for some of the most rigorous legislative challenges since the market opened.
The timing of this internal restructuring is critical. The Netherlands is currently navigating a period of profound political instability following the snap election in late 2025. While Rob Jetten of the Democrats 66 party attempts to broker a centrist coalition, the future of the Remote Gambling Act (KOA) remains in the balance. Lawmakers have signalled a clear intent to replace the current framework with stricter mandates focused on protecting young adults under the age of 24 and addressing severe harms such as financial ruin and suicide.
Furthermore, the industry must prepare for a significant fiscal squeeze, as the planned tax hike to 38 percent of gross gaming revenue by 2027 remains firmly on the agenda despite the shifting political sands.
The decision by the KSA to transition toward a directorate led model is a calculated response to a market that has become increasingly difficult to police. For years, the Dutch regulator has struggled with a surge in unlicensed activity and the rapid evolution of gambling technology. By creating a dedicated directorate for Digitalisation and Analysis, the KSA is finally acknowledging that traditional boots on the ground oversight is no longer sufficient. In an age where artificial intelligence can be used by bad actors to circumvent player protection tools, the regulator must possess the same level of technical sophistication as the operators it monitors.
However, the KSA is operating against a backdrop of worrying industry data. Recent audits suggesting that channelisation rates have dipped below 50 percent are an absolute siren call for the Dutch government. When more than half of the gambling revenue is flowing toward the black market, the regulatory framework has effectively failed in its primary objective. The upcoming legislative overhaul must find a delicate balance between imposing strict harm reduction measures and ensuring that the legal market remains attractive enough to keep players away from dangerous, unregulated offshore sites. If the new government leans too heavily into restrictions, they risk driving even more consumers into the arms of illegal operators.
Lastly, the looming tax increase to 38 percent of gross gaming revenue is likely to be the biggest point of contention between the KSA, the government, and licensed operators. Such a high tax burden is almost unprecedented in a mature European market and could lead to a mass exodus of legal brands. While the political consensus in the Kamer seems focused on social responsibility, they must not ignore the economic reality of the sector. A three-directorate governance model might provide better oversight, but it cannot fix a broken market if the fiscal and legislative environment becomes fundamentally unworkable for legitimate business.
