Anti-money-laundering as it is actually operated in a gambling business, rather than as it is described in a policy document. The course covers why the sector is attractive to launderers and the typologies that follow from it, the business risk assessment every control is supposed to derive from, customer due diligence and beneficial ownership, source of funds and source of wealth and why they are harder here than in banking, transaction monitoring and the alert-volume trap, sanctions screening and why it follows strict liability rather than a risk-based logic, and the reporting, records and governance that decide whether the framework holds.
Written for the people who run it: financial crime and compliance teams, nominated officers and their deputies, payments and VIP staff who see the first indicator, and executives accountable for the function. It assumes working knowledge of how a gambling operator makes money.
No jurisdiction's thresholds, retention periods or reporting deadlines are stated as fact, because they differ by market and change. What the course teaches is the structure of the obligation, how each control is supposed to connect to the one before it, and the short list of failures that published enforcement keeps finding.
Abu Dhabi, Bhutan and Malta's financial regulators are observing a post-quantum custody pilot using the NIST signature standard finalised two years ago. The reason to care is not the cryptography. It is which regulators turned up.
The White House has set a hard deadline, Trump has called the bill very powerful, and prediction markets have cut its odds from 82% to about 25%. Republicans hold 53 seats and cloture needs 60.
An attacker minted 329 trillion SAND on Base, roughly 110,000 times the token's entire legitimate supply, and walked away with about $675,000. The gap between those two numbers is the whole story, and it is not a reassuring one.
