Why the firm's side matters
Every spread bet has two sides, and the customer's counterparty is usually the firm itself. The FCA put it plainly in 2016: the investment firm typically takes the other side of the transaction to that of the client, trading as principal. That one fact shapes how these firms earn money, what can sink them, and why regulators watch their incentives so closely.
The earlier lessons looked at the bet from the customer's seat. This one looks from the firm's: revenue, what the firm does with the risk it takes on, how customer money is protected, what the Swiss franc shock of January 2015 revealed, and why sports spread books are different.
Where the money comes from
Three revenue lines recur across the sector.
- The spread. The gap between the sell and buy price (lesson 1) is earned every time a customer opens and closes a position. In December 2022 the FCA wrote that the majority of CFD firms generate revenue primarily from the spread clients cross; in that letter "CFDs" includes spread bets.
- Overnight funding. A financial spread bet held past the daily cut-off is charged funding (lesson 3). The same letter names charges "levied to fund a position overnight" as the main additional income.
- Commission and interest. Some products charge commission, and firms earn interest on the cash customers leave with them.
IG Group's interim annual report for the seven months to 31 December 2025 shows how this appears in accounts. It splits total revenue into net trading revenue plus net interest income, defining total revenue as "net revenue from products and services and interest on client money". Net trading revenue was £1,004.6 million for the 12 months to 31 December 2025, of which OTC derivatives (the category that includes spread bets and CFDs) contributed £781.4 million. The interest line matters: when rates fall, so does that income, whatever customers do.
Market making: internalise, hedge or both
Every customer position creates an exposure for the firm. The FCA described three broad responses in 2016: some firms hedge their market exposure through external liquidity providers, by risk appetite or trade by trade; others assume the full market risk; and some trade as "matched principal", filling a client order only when they have a matching hedge.
Large firms often combine the first two. Customers' positions partly cancel each other out, which is called internalisation, and the firm hedges only the remainder.
Illustration. Clients buy a stock index for a combined £5,000 a point and other clients sell it for £3,500 a point. The £3,500 offsets, leaving the firm short £1,500 a point. A 100-point rise would cost the firm £150,000, so if £1,500 a point exceeds its limit, it buys index futures to cover part of it. The spread is still earned on all £8,500 a point of client trading.
IG Group's report describes this model in its own words: its OTC derivatives business model is based on the internalisation of customer trading, with unmatched exposures above Board-approved limits required to be hedged, hedging limits that tighten in less liquid periods, real-time monitoring and stress tests run hourly. The same report says the group increased its appetite for market risk during the period. A stated appetite is a choice, and it can change.
The conflict built into the model
Where client risk is not hedged, client losses become firm gains. The FCA's 2022 letter says that where the market risk from customer activity is under-hedged, firms also directly profit from customer losses, and that because spread income grows with activity, firms profit when customers trade more often or in larger size than they otherwise would. Its December 2024 letter announced a review of whether firms deliver fair value in spreads, overnight funding charges and commissions under the Consumer Duty.
This does not make a hedged firm virtuous and an unhedged one not. It means the hedging policy, the incentive scheme and the marketing have to be read together.
Client money and capital
Customers deposit cash to cover margin. In the UK that money falls under the client money rules in chapter 7 of the FCA's Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS 7), which exist to keep client money and assets safe if firms fail. The Supreme Court summarised the mechanism in 2012: CASS 7 provides for the segregation of client money, and it creates a statutory trust over client money, keeping it out of the firm's own estate on insolvency.
Segregation only works if it is done properly. Worldspreads, a spread betting and CFD platform, entered special administration on 18 March 2012 after a substantial client money deficit emerged. At the High Court's judgment of 19 June 2015, agreed client claims totalled £28.6 million across 4,865 clients, with an expected total return from the client money pool of about 18.3p in the pound.
The sums are large. At 31 December 2025, IG Group reported £2,861.9 million of client money in segregated bank accounts and money market funds, excluded from its balance sheet. Professional clients may instead sign title transfer collateral arrangements (TTCAs), and in October 2025 the FCA warned that opting up can mean client funds move out of segregated client money accounts. Its 2024 letter said around 40% of firms in the portfolio held professional client money under TTCAs, and that two recent failures had led to shortfalls in TTCA funds.
Capital is the second line of defence. Under the Investment Firms Prudential Regime, in force since January 2022, firms assess their own capital and liquidity needs through an Internal Capital Adequacy and Risk Assessment (ICARA). IG Group reported regulatory capital resources of £808.2 million against a requirement of £298.6 million at 31 December 2025.
What the Swiss franc taught
On 15 January 2015 the Swiss National Bank announced it was discontinuing the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro and cutting the rate on sight deposit balances above an exemption threshold to minus 0.75%. The result, in the FCA's words, was a sudden and significant change in the value of the Swiss Franc, and prices gapped past customers' stops (lesson 3 covers the effect on a single position).
For firms, the lesson was about credit risk. When losses exceed deposits, the firm owes its hedge brokers at once but must collect from customers who may not pay. The FCA described the chain in 2016: firms facing margin calls from liquidity providers must seek margin from clients, and in an extreme scenario this may make the firm insolvent. This happened to Alpari UK after the unpegging. FCA supervisors then visited 24 firms to review client assets controls and found concerns in over a third.
Three lessons followed: hedging that works in normal markets can fail when prices gap; high leverage turns customer losses into the firm's bad debts; and resilience depends on the weakest counterparty as well as the firm's own book. Negative balance protection, required for UK retail customers from 1 August 2019 (lesson 4), moved that bad-debt risk firmly onto the firm.
Sports spread books: a different risk shape
The FCA's 2019 retail restrictions cover only MiFID financial instruments, so the regulator excluded sports spread bets from them. Sports risk also behaves differently. There is no futures contract on a match's corners or booking points, so the firm manages exposure mainly through its prices, its spread width and its maximum stake per point.
Correlated outcomes. Markets on the same match move together. Total goals, corners, booking points and a match performance index all tend to rise in an open, chaotic game. A customer who buys several of them is making one bet several times over.
Illustration. Across ten Saturday matches, customers have bought total goals for a combined £2,000 a goal per match, at an average of 2.6. If every match makes up at 4.0 goals, the firm pays 1.4 × £2,000 × 10 = £28,000 on that market alone, and its corners and performance index books are probably losing at the same time.
Extreme results. Fixed-odds liability is capped at the payout. A spread market's liability grows with the size of the result, so a cricket innings that runs away or a 7-0 cup tie can cost multiples of an ordinary loss. That is the case for the tightest stake limits on the markets with the widest possible ranges, and why the liability thinking in Sportsbook Trading applies here with a longer tail.
How to use this
When reading a spread-betting firm's results or disclosures, check:
- Revenue mix. Spreads and funding against interest on client cash, which falls when rates do.
- Hedging policy. Internalise and hedge above limits, fully hedge, or run the book? Has the stated risk appetite changed?
- Client money. How much is segregated, how much sits under TTCAs, and with which banks and brokers.
- Capital headroom. Resources against requirement, and whether stress tests cover price gaps.
- Incentives. Whether pay, marketing and product design reward customer trading volume.
A common mistake is to treat "the firm hedges" as the end of the analysis. Hedging reduces market risk but adds counterparty and liquidity risk, and January 2015 showed both can arrive at once. The next lesson turns to the risk that matters most: the customer's.