Why the customer's risk is the point
The through-line of this course is that a spread bet is a bet on how far, with a stake per point and an outcome open in both directions. Lesson 5 showed how firms manage that risk. This lesson is about the people on the other side: how often they lose, how the rules try to limit the damage, and where trading behaviour starts to look like gambling harm.
Anyone in a product, compliance, marketing or editorial role at a spread-betting firm needs these facts, because the regulator judges firms on customer outcomes. Lesson 4 set out the FCA's retail rules. Here the focus is the evidence behind them and how to read it.
What the regulator's data shows
Regulators have measured retail outcomes on CFDs, financial spread bets and rolling spot forex together, because the FCA treats them as one product family. The findings have been consistent.
| When measured | Source | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 sample of eight major UK providers | FCA, CP16/40 | Over 80% of client accounts made a loss over a year; average result a loss of £2,200 |
| National studies across the EU, reported March 2018 | ESMA | 74% to 89% of retail accounts typically lose money; average losses per client €1,600 to €29,000 |
| August to October 2017 | FCA, CP18/38 | An estimated 78% of active retail accounts loss-making; £268.4 million lost in three months, projected at £1.07 billion a year |
The sources are the FCA's December 2016 consultation, ESMA's 27 March 2018 announcement and the FCA's December 2018 consultation, which also found that on average 279,000 retail accounts traded each month in 2017. These figures are older than the current rules, but they are the evidence base the rules were built on.
Reading the risk warning
Since 1 August 2019, UK firms offering leveraged CFDs, spread bets or rolling spot forex to retail clients must display a standardised warning set out in PS19/18 and described in lesson 4. Its core is one sentence: "[percentage]% of retail investor accounts lose money when trading CFDs with this provider." The percentage is the share of the firm's retail accounts that lost money over the previous 12 months. A firm with no retail trades in the previous 12 months says instead that "the vast majority of retail client accounts lose money". On a website or app the warning must sit in its own border, fixed at the top of the screen while the user scrolls.
The figure is useful and also limited:
- It counts accounts, not money. It says nothing about how much losers lose or winners win. During consultation, respondents suggested firms disclose the distribution of losses instead.
- It measures a period, not a person. A customer's own odds depend on leverage, holding period and behaviour.
- It is per account by design. The FCA noted in 2016 that clients tend to run losses and take smaller profits, so a per-trade win rate can look healthier than the overall experience.
Illustration. A firm has 100 retail accounts. Thirty end the year up an average of £300, seventy end it down an average of £2,000. The warning reads 70%. A rival with the same 70% whose losers lost £200 each is a very different business, and the percentage alone cannot show it.
Appropriateness and who gets let in
Because CFD-type products are complex instruments under MiFID and are usually sold without advice, firms must assess whether a product is appropriate, testing the customer's knowledge and experience. The FCA found this gate weak. Its 2015 review found shortcomings in the appropriateness test across all firms in its sample. Its 2018 consultation reported that, at firms covering over 70% of the market, between 20% and 48% of consumers failed the appropriateness test yet were allowed to trade after a warning, and that the average income of retail customers at one firm was £15,000 to £30,000 a year.
The second gate is client categorisation. A customer treated as an "elective professional" loses retail protections, including leverage limits. The FCA's 2022 letter described firms inappropriately opting up retail customers, sometimes with banned incentives. In October 2025 it warned of "high-pressure techniques to encourage investors to claim they are professional clients". In December 2025 it consulted, in CP25/36, on allowing elective professional status only where a client has actively requested it and given informed consent to lose all retail protections, with any attempt to incentivise or pressure a client prohibited; that consultation closed on 2 February 2026, so check whether final rules have since been made.
What intervention changed
The sequence is short: the FCA's consultation in December 2016, ESMA's temporary EU measures agreed in March 2018, the FCA's permanent rules in PS19/18 in July 2019 (lesson 4 covers the content). The measured effects at UK firms, comparing August to October 2018 with the same months of 2017, were that total retail losses fell by £77.3 million (projected at £309.1 million a year), automatic margin close-outs fell by 99.5%, and debt written off by firms for customers in negative equity fell by £33.4 million.
One detail is easy to miss. The FCA said it did not expect leverage limits to necessarily increase the percentage of accounts that make a profit. The rules reduce how much people lose, mainly by reducing how much they trade; they do not make customers more likely to win. In October 2025 the FCA said the protections stop nearly 400,000 people a year from risking more than their original stake.
Where trading meets gambling harm
Financial spread betting is regulated as investment, yet the FCA itself describes CFDs as a way to bet on the price of a share or asset, and some users show the patterns seen in problem gambling.
- An FCA research article published on 21 November 2022 surveyed over 3,000 users of four trading apps, using an adapted Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). It placed 3.75% in the problem gambling band, against 3.5% for online gamblers, and around one in five in the at-risk and problem bands combined. The FCA noted that this does not tell us whether app design features cause poor outcomes.
- A 2021 peer-reviewed study of 795 US investors who also gambled found that self-reported stock portfolio turnover was positively associated with problem gambling scores. It is cross-sectional and self-reported, so it shows association, not cause.
- In its December 2024 letter the FCA asked CFD firms to identify and support vulnerable customers, "given the potentially addictive nature of some types of CFD trading".
Sports spread betting is a bet on a sporting result, and the harm frameworks in What Gambling Harm Actually Is and Affordability and Financial Risk Assessment apply directly. Note too that the FCA's 2019 restrictions, including negative balance protection, exclude sports spread bets.
Common misconceptions
- "Negative balance protection makes it safe." It stops a retail account going below zero. The whole balance can still be lost.
- "The warning percentage is my chance of losing." It is last year's share of losing accounts at that firm.
- "Professional status is an upgrade." It removes leverage limits and other retail protections.
- "A UK name means UK protection." The FCA has found firms redirecting UK customers to associated entities in third countries without equivalent protections.
What to check in a product or compliance role
- The warning figure over time, and whether marketing, apps and affiliate content display it as the rules require.
- Appropriateness outcomes: the fail rate, and what happens to customers who fail.
- Opt-up volumes and how professional status is offered.
- Affiliates and finfluencers: the FCA said in October 2025 that over 90,000 people lost around £75 million over four years at one firm after finfluencers promised unrealistic returns.
- Vulnerability signals: deposit escalation, chasing losses and repeated close-outs, the same signals a gambling operator watches.
The common thread is that a firm's numbers describe outcomes for real people. Reading them that way is what regulators expect, and what the Consumer Duty requires firms to evidence.